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From: Jeffrey Epstein [jeeyacation@gmail.com]
Sent: 2/11/2013 5:45:09 PM
To: Larry Summers
Subject: prep for dinner, israel pres briefing /
The Wall Street Journal
The Ayatollah Always Says No
Editorial
February 8, 2013 --The Farsi word for "no" is na h, which is easy enough
to remember. Maybe even Joe Biden won't forget it the next time the U.S.
tries to reach out diplomatically to Iran.
We're speaking of the Administration's latest effort to come to terms with
Tehran over its nuclear programs, which Mr. Biden made last weekend at
the Munich Security Conference. The U.S. offer of direct bilateral talks,
he said, "stands, but it must be real and tangible." Iranian foreign minister
Ali Akbar Salehi, who was also at the conference though he refused to
meet with U.S. officials, called Mr. Biden's comments "a step forward."
Mr. Salehi's remark set the usual hearts aflutter that Iran is finally serious
about a deal. But the optimism was brief On Thursday, Iran's Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei flatly rejected direct talks with the U.S.
"The U.S. is pointing a gun at Iran and wants us to talk to them," he said.
"Direct talks will not solve any problems."
This isn't the first time Mr. Khamenei has played chaste Daphne to
President Obama's infatuated Apollo. Just after becoming President in
2009, Mr. Obama sent the Ayatollah two private letters and delivered a
conciliatory speech for the Persian new year of Nowruz. Mr. Khamenei's
answer: "They chant the slogan of change but no change is seen in
practice." He told a crowd chanting "death to America" that "if a hand is
stretched covered with a velvet glove but it is cast iron inside, that makes
no sense."
That was in March 2009. In October of that year the U.S. and its allies
tentatively worked out a deal with Iranian negotiators to move some of
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their enriched uranium outside Iran. Western analysts were confident that
Mr. Khamenei would give his blessing, given the international pressure he
was said to be under following the fraudulent elections and the bloody
crackdown that followed.
The Ayatollah quashed that deal too: "Whenever they [Americans] smile
at the officials of the Islamic revolution, when we carefully look at the
situation, we notice that they are hiding a dagger behind their back."
It was the same in January 2011, when diplomacy also collapsed. Ditto in
2012, when negotiations in February, May and June each ended in failure.
Washington went into those talks thinking they were going to succeed on
the theory that Tehran desperately wants relief from the supposedly
crippling pressure of economic sanctions.
Why does the Ayatollah keep saying no? The conventional wisdom is that
previous U.S. offers weren't generous enough, or that the wrong President
was in the White House, or that Iran wants only to deal directly with the
U.S. and not in multilateral forums. Each of these theories has been tested
and shown to be false.
A more persuasive explanation—get ready for this shocker—is that Iran
really wants a bomb. The regime believes, not unreasonably, that
Moammar Gadhafi would still be in power had he not given up his nuclear
program in 2003. Mr. Khamenei also fears a "velvet revolution" scenario,
in which more normal ties with the West threaten the ideological
foundations of the Islamic Republic. Confrontation with America is in this
regime's DNA.
Meantime, the pretense of negotiations has allowed Tehran to play for
time to advance its programs. When Mr. Obama took office, Iran had
enriched 1,000 kilos of reactor-grade uranium. In its last report from
November, U.N. inspectors found that Iran has produced 7,611 kilos to
reactor grade, along with 232 kilos of uranium enriched to 20%, which is
close to bomb-grade. Last month, Iran declared that it would install 3,000
advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility, which can enrich uranium at
two to three times its current rate.
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As for the sanctions, they may hurt ordinary Iranians but this regime is
famously indifferent to the suffering of its own people. The Ayatollah also
doesn't seem to take the Administration's talk about "all options being on
the table" seriously. Mr. Obama's nomination of Iran dove Chuck Hagel to
be Secretary of Defense reinforces that impression, as do reports that the
White House blocked Pentagon and CIA plans to arm the opposition that's
fighting to overthrow Iran's client regime in Damascus. An America that
won't help proxies in a proxy war isn't likely to take the fight directly to
Iran's nuclear facilities.
In rejecting Mr. Biden's offer, the Ayatollah said frankly, "I'm not a
diplomat; I'm a revolutionary." Another round of multilateral talks with
Iran is set to resume this month, but maybe Joe Biden and his boss should
start taking no for an answer.
Article 2.
Foreign Policy
Let's face it: Obama's Iran policy is failing
James Traub
February 8, 2013 -- There is no better example of an Obama
administration initiative that has succeeded on its own terms, and yet
failed as policy, than Iran. By engaging the regime in Tehran, and being
rebuffed, the White House has been able to enlist China, Russia, and the
European Union in imposing tough sanctions on Iran. By steadily
ratcheting up those sanctions, the administration has been able to
gradually squeeze the Iranian economy. By insisting that "containment" is
not an option, Obama has persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu that he need not launch an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities --
at least not any time soon.
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Obama has done everything right, and yet his Iran policy is failing. There
is no evidence that the sanctions will bring Iran to its knees and force the
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to accept the humiliation of
abandoning his nuclear program. But neither is there any sign of new
thinking in the White House. "I don't see how what didn't work last year is
going to work this year," says Vali Nasr, who served in the Obama State
Department before becoming dean of the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. He might not get much of an argument
from White House officials, who, the New York Times recently noted,
"seem content with stalemate."
The United States is not negotiating directly with Iran but rather doing so
through the P5+1, which consists of the five permanent Security Council
members and Germany. The P5+1's current position is that Iran must stop
enriching nuclear fuel to 20 percent purity -- a point from which Iran
could quickly move to weapons-grade material -- transfer its existing stock
of such fuel to a third country, and shut down one of its two enrichment
facilities, known as Fordow. In exchange, the parties will help Iran
produce such fuel for medical purposes, which the regime claims is its
actual goal. Iran has refused, saying it will not shut down Fordow.
But the current state of play masks the larger issue, which is that the
ayatollah and those around him believe the United States wants to make
Iran cry uncle -- which happens to be true. The next round of P5+1
negotiations, now scheduled for Feb. 25 in Kazakhstan, are almost
certainly not going to go anywhere unless the United States signals that it
is prepared to make what the Iranians view as meaningful and equivalent
moves in exchange for Iranian concessions. Arms-control experts say that
both British Prime Minister David Cameron and Catherine Ashton, head
of foreign affairs for the European Union, favor offering Iran a reduction
in sanctions; but there's a limit to what they can do without the United
States.
Of course, such flexibility would be pointless if Iran is simply hell-bent on
gaining the capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. The signals, as always
with Iran, are cryptic. Iranian authorities have told nuclear inspectors that
they plan to install a new generation of centrifuges in order to accelerate
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enrichment. And yet Iran also chose to convert some of its stockpile of
highly enriched uranium for medical use rather than approach the amount
needed for a bomb, leading Israeli authorities to predict that Iran wouldn't
be able to build a bomb before 2015 or 2016. Last week, Ali Akbar
Velayati, Khamenei's foreign policy advisor, publicly criticized officials
who have treated the negotiations dismissively. Presumably, he was
thinking of President Mahmoud Ahmadinej ad, who has compared Iran's
nuclear program to a train without brakes.
Iran is now at the outset of what promises to be a raucous presidential
election, and may be no more capable of serious negotiations between now
and June than the United States was in 2012. But what is clear is that the
sanctions have moderated Iranian behavior and rhetoric. At the same time,
as the Times also noted, the economic pressure is not nearly great enough
to compel concessions that the regime would view as a blow to national
pride. In short, Iran might -- might -- be more willing to accept a face-
saving compromise than they were a year or two ago, but will need serious
inducements to do so.
What would that entail? Virtually all the proposals that have come from
outside experts suggest that the P5+1 begin with modest confidence-
building measures, especially in the period before the election. A recent
report by the Arms Control Association enumerates several of them.
Western diplomats, for example, could take up Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's
foreign minister, on his proposal to limit the "extent" of enrichment -- i.e.,
well below 20 percent -- in exchange for fuel rods for the research reaction
and a recognition of Iran's "right to enrich," a notional concept the United
States already supports under specified conditions. Or Iran could suspend
20-percent enrichment in exchange for a suspension of new sanctions. But
Iran is unlikely to accept even such small steps unless it felt that additional
moves would win additional explicit concessions.
Beyond that, the outlines of what in Middle East peacemaking is known as
"final status" are clear enough: Iran agrees to verifiable inspections to
ensure that it does not enrich uranium beyond 3.5 percent and does not
pursue a nuclear weapons program, while the West accepts Iran's "right to
enrich" and dismantles sanctions. Of course, the outlines of a Middle East
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peace deal are clear enough, too. But in both cases, neither side trusts the
other, and each demands that the other go first. Instead, nobody goes
anywhere.
U.S. officials have very good reason to be wary of Iran's bona fides. In
2009, they reached a deal with Iranian negotiators to send the stockpile of
highly enriched uranium out of the country -- only to see the ayatollah
repudiate it. As Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert with the Council on Foreign
Relations puts it, "Khamenei has created a politics where it's hard for him
to compromise." But so has the United States. Anyone who watched
Chuck Hagel's confirmation hearing knows that it is an article of faith in
Congress -- and pretty much a bipartisan one -- that Iran is a faithless,
illegitimate terrorist state that will be deterred from building a bomb only
by the threat of massive attack. Had Hagel been foolish enough to suggest
that the United States offer to reduce sanctions in exchange for Iranian
concessions, the White House would have had to find a new candidate for
defense secretary.
It's the U.S. Congress that arguably holds the high cards, though the White
House put them in its hands. The most potent sanctions are legislated, and
have been written in such a way that they will be very hard to unwind.
Obama can waive them for up to six months. But the ayatollah is not about
to make irreversible decisions in exchange for six months of relief.
The White House is thus stuck between Tehran and Capitol Hill. And it
can't live long with the current stalemate. After all, Obama has said that
"containment" is not an option. He is hoping that the combination of
economic pain and fear of military action will bring Tehran to its senses. If
it doesn't, the president has said that he is prepared to use force. Perhaps
he feels that just as spurned engagement served as the predicate for tough
sanctions, so would failed negotiations lay the predicate for a broadly
supported strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran left us no choice, he
might say, as the bombers fly.
That would constitute a diplomatic triumph ... if a strike against Iran's
nuclear facilities is a good idea. If in fact it's a dreadful prospect -- worse,
perhaps, even than containment -- then it would constitute a failure that
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would obliterate the record of adroit diplomacy of the last four years.
Obama understands very well -- even if many members of Congress do
not -- that even our worst adversaries have interests of their own, that
those interests feel as legitimate to them as ours do to us, and that we at
least have a chance of settling disputes with them if we can find the place
where our interests overlap. The time has come for him to apply that
wisdom to Iran.
James Traub is a fellow of the Center on International Cooperation.
Article 3.
The National
An uneasy courtship as Iran and Egypt test
the waters
Alan Philps
Feb 8, 2013 -- There is a consensus among commentators that the visit of
the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Egypt - complete with
red carpet and kiss on both cheeks from President Mohammed Morsi -
does not amount to a breakthrough. The view of US think-tanks is that it
does not amount to very much at all, and certainly not worth getting
anxious about. Such a consensus is always dangerous, and it is worth
looking more closely at what it is based on.
Mr Ahmadinejad is the first Iranian leader to set foot in Cairo since the
deposed Shah of Iran was given refuge in Cairo, where he died and
received a state funeral. The two countries have not had diplomatic
relations since 1979.
The Iranian president's visit has deep historical significance, even if he
came as a guest of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference summit.
The picture of the two presidents embracing says to the world: Egypt is
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released from the US straitjacket and is free to resume its position as a
regional power.
There are plenty of reasons, however, to dismiss the visit as just show. Mr
Ahmadinejad is a lame duck, banned by the constitution from running for
a third term in the June elections. As Iran moves into a period of war
economy under the pressure of sanctions designed to curb its nuclear
programme, Mr Ahmadinejad is engaged in a furious struggle to ensure
that his rival, the parliamentary speaker, Ali Larijani, does not succeed
him. The corruption allegations levelled by Mr Ahmadinejad against the
Larijani family are deeply damaging to the Iranian regime.
Mr Morsi, meanwhile, has little to show Egyptians that he has improved
their lot. Cairo is the scene of near-constant street battles and the economy
is tanking. Egypt's currency reserves have just sunk to $13.6 billion (Dh50
billion), below the critical level needed to cover three months of imports.
The country is staring bankruptcy in the face, but cannot access
emergency funds from the International Monetary Fund without
implementing unpopular reforms that would further raise social tensions.
Both leaders need to show that they have "friends" abroad. The reality is a
little different. Egypt and Iran appear to be divided by the Syria conflict,
which is symptomatic of the wider split between the Sunni Muslim
powers, led by Saudi Arabia, and Iran's faltering "axis of resistance" that,
with Syria in play and Hamas having defected, now looks increasingly like
a Shia Muslim axis.
If we look more closely, then the story of Egypt resuming its role as a
regional power looks premature. At this stage, Egypt is trying to find some
space to manoeuvre between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Given that Saudi
Arabia has the money that Egypt needs, and Washington has a lock on the
actions of the IMF, that space is limited.
But what does Washington think? Not very much at the moment. With
President Barack Obama's second term team still being assembled, it is not
surprising that there is something of a vacuum in Middle East policy. But
the issue is deeper than that. The Obama administration has declared it
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wants to focus on the Asia-Pacific region and, surprisingly, it means what
it says.
Only a year after troops withdrew from Iraq, that country is not talked
about in Washington, like an embarrassing relative. In North Africa, the
US military has taken a back seat while the work of toppling Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi and driving back the jihadists in Mali has been left to
Franco-British forces. Syrian policy is one of drift, where the
administration finds all options unpalatable. In Egypt, Washington has set
a red line for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership: it must adhere to the
peace treaty with Israel. Everything else is negotiable.
This week the Pentagon revealed that it would no longer be stationing two
aircraft carriers in the Gulf region, as it has done for most of the past two
years, due to cuts in the defence budget, and the possibility of even more
stringent ones if Congress fails to agree on raising the US debt ceiling.
The Iranian nuclear programme remains a priority in Washington, but the
carrier decision indicates a less warlike stance. One cannot say that US
power is ebbing, but there is a clear lack of political will in Washington
for decisive action in the Middle East. For now, the logic is that regional
powers will have to take more responsibility. Egypt, although impotent at
the moment, will have to find its role. The US needs to talk to Iran if there
is ever going to be a compromise on its nuclear programme. Maybe Egypt
could help.
Both Egypt and Iran have denied a report that General Qassem Suleimani,
commander of the Quds force, a division of the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the man responsible for Iran's military
operations in Syria, visited Cairo in January. There was no reaction in
Washington to this report.
If there is going to be a resolution of the Syrian crisis without a decade of
Lebanon-style war, then allies of the US will have to speak to someone of
the calibre of Gen Suleimani, a far more important figure than Mr
Ahmadinejad. Could this lead to a historic compromise between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the ayatollahs to create a new Islamic front
spreading revolution?
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That is out of the question. Egypt is too reliant on foreign finance, which
Iran cannot offer at the moment, for it to swing into Tehran's orbit. And
there is far too much domestic opposition.
What is clear is that while the US is reluctant to take direct responsibility,
other countries must find ways of resolving the regional contradictions
that have become unmanageable in the era of American tutelage. That will
lead to some unlikely meetings taking place. The Morsi-Ahmadinejad
embrace may not be a breakthrough, but it does show one thing: what was
unthinkable a few years ago may one day be the norm.
Article 4.
Al-Monitor
llamas Weighs Options For Recognizing Israel
Adnan Abu Amer
February 8 -- Recently, a lot has been said — and a lot of denials have
been issued — about Hamas recognizing a two-state solution. It appears
that Hamas is still vacillating between explicitly and implicitly
recognizing Israel. Hamas realizes that recognizing Israel would open up
the world's doors to the movement. At the same time, Hamas knows that
such a move would be seen as a betrayal by the movement's supporters,
both inside and outside Palestine. As Hamas well knows, its legitimacy
derives from its vocal support for armed struggle within the complicated
Palestinian reality. Hamas also knows that it will pay a heavy price if it is
seen to be agreeing to international conditions. The cost will not only be
political, but also ideological. Hamas has spent many years talking and
writing about its notion of the state, its identity, borders, concept,
constitution and the role of Islam within it. Generations of Hamas
members were raised on those ideas. But those ideas have remained part
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of the imagination and heritage, and of the nostalgic dream of restoring the
Islamic caliphate.
The concept of the state
Today's debate within Hamas over the concept of the state is more
concrete than theoretical. The political conditions in the Palestinian
territories do not allow for dreaming about unrealistic grand theories being
promoted by some Islamist movements. Hamas is facing real-world
problems that require real-world solutions. The Palestinian state being
envisioned by Palestinian, Arab, and world politicians is based on the June
1967 borders. But does that fit Hamas's political vision and intellectual
orientation? Generations of Islamists have been raised on the concept of
the "Islamic state," which is synonymous with the Islamic caliphate. But
Hamas's situation is a little different. Israel's occupation of all Palestinian
territories is a political and concrete obstacle to the dream of an Islamic
state and it forces the consideration of more realistic options. So we have
started hearing, from Hamas, statements about establishing a Palestinian
state on the June 1967 borders. There is no doubt that this development is
an intellectual and political shift by Hamas. More than 20 years ago,
Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin proposed a long truce with Israel.
But today, such a proposal is more realistic and is attributed to Hamas's
current leader Khaled Meshaal. Hamas in 2013 is different than Hamas in
1993. Hamas is now an influential player and its statements and stances
are taken into account by regional and international decision-making
circles.
Recognition and commitment
The shuttle diplomacy by Western officials between Gaza, where Hamas's
domestic leadership is located, and the Arab capitals of Doha, Cairo and
Amman have only one objective: getting Hamas to agree to the conditions
that would allow it to be embraced by the international community. In
other words, they want Hamas to agree to the two-state solution. And that,
explicitly or implicitly, essentially means that Hamas has recognized
Israel's right to exist! Those who have been following Hamas's course
since it was founded 25 years ago notice that every once in awhile there is
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international pressure to make Hamas agree to those conditions. But
Hamas is afraid to fall into the same trap that others, like Fatah, have
fallen into without getting anything in return except loss of popular
support, as was demonstrated in the elections seven years ago. In light of
the demands that the movement should recognize the two-state solution
and make political commitments, some influential circles within the
Hamas leadership think that the movement is being drawn into going
beyond its rational political discourse and how it deals with the reality on
the ground, and into recognizing Israel and exchanging messages with
it. However, the siege has made the Palestinian territories miserable. So
decision-makers in Hamas are forced to issue hints and signals that do not
affect the movement's general principles. Those signals, however, may be
misunderstood. And this is where the problem lies. No one thinks that
Hamas supporters will make a big deal of those signals, but any concrete
steps toward recognizing Israel will cost Hamas dearly, something which I
don't think Hamas wants during this dangerous phase. At the external
level, Hamas's enemies and opponents may think that the siege has finally
paid off, albeit a little late, and that Hamas's current declarations are
signals that, if the siege and the Palestinian suffering continue, the
movement may explicitly recognize Israel, which would open the
"appetite" of Hamas' opponents for more breakthroughs in its ideology
and principles.
Not an existential conflict, but a border dispute.
Although Hamas is aware of all that, it should be noted that in a few
months it is facing elections during which the movement's signals that it
may accept a two-state solution will be used in a fierce anti-Hamas
campaign. Even though the movement has provided a different
administrative performance than before, the fundamental change in the
movement's political program may be a decisive factor for the Palestinian
voters. As Hamas is being smothered, with a few breaches here and there,
the demands that it should recognize Israel are ongoing and without letup.
In other words, Hamas must choose between recognizing Israel to stay in
power, or losing what it has achieved democratically as punishment for
having to refused to bow to the world's conditions. In reality, the
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international community has not significantly changed its relationship with
the Palestinians, including Hamas, over the past months and years. There
has only been some cosmetic and tactical changes. Washington, the
European Union and the UN have not only signaled to Hamas that it
should join the "broken and paralyzed" peace process, they have also
insisted that the Palestinians explicitly recognize Israel. But this time,
those powers are armed with an "Islamic religious cloak," which would
make a recognition of Israel more meaningful, especially since Hamas
considers its conflict with Israel to be an ideological "existential conflict,
not a border dispute." That pressure is accompanied with a financial and
economic blockade, which is increasing the pressure on Hamas, especially
since those carrying out the blockade are blocking anything that would
alleviate Palestinian suffering. It is clear that they want to punish the
Palestinians for electing Hamas and warn them against reelecting them;
that is if the reconciliation succeeds and the elections happen on time. It
should be noted that certain Israeli and Western research institutions have
estimated the timeframe that Hamas will need to explicitly recognize
Israel. They may accept from Hamas certain rhetorical signals for a while
before the movement officially recognizes Israel. Since Hamas was
founded in late 1987, it has been conducting an ideological and political
campaign for its members and supporters against recognizing Israel.
Hamas' constitution says that Israel is a "cancer that must be eradicated,"
and that "its demise is a Quranic inevitability." Those and other slogans
have been a key component of Hamas's political discourse. It is therefore
not easy for Hamas to change overnight due to political realism and
suddenly tell its supporters: We shall recognize Israel, but it's under
duress!
Adnan Abu Amer is Dean of the Faculty of Arts, and a lecturer in the
history of the Palestinian issue, national security, political science and
Islamic civilization at Al Ummah University Open Education.
Article 6.
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NYT
An Assassination in Tunisia
Editorial
February 8, 2013 -- Tunisia is where the Arab Spring began just over two
years ago. Until now it has set an encouraging example of progress toward
democracy and pluralism. Free elections brought to power a coalition
government pledged to pragmatic cooperation between a moderate-led
Islamist party, Ennanda, and smaller, secular coalition partners.
Progress has not always been smooth. But just as Tunisians inspired
people in neighboring countries like Egypt and Libya to rise up against
their corrupt and repressive dictators, they also seemed, for many, to point
the way toward a democratic future accommodating both religious beliefs
and the rights of the secular under the rule of law.
Those hopes have been severely shaken by the murder on Wednesday of
Chokri Belaid. Mr. Belaid, a human- rights activist and one of Ennanda's
most outspoken critics, had publicly challenged the party's failure to
investigate or prosecute violent acts of intimidation carried out by
shadowy gangs of religious extremists. Mr. Belaid's killers have not yet
been identified. But suspicion now falls on those same extremist groups,
which had issued public threats against Mr. Belaid and other prominent
secular leaders — without any serious government response.
Thousands gathered for Mr. Belaid's funeral on Friday amid a nationwide
general strike called by his trade union supporters. Tensions are high.
What is urgently needed is a credible, independent investigation of Mr.
Belaid's murder, followed by prosecution of the killers.
Given Ennanda's record of selectively ignoring Islamist violence, that
investigation cannot be left to its appointees alone. A preferable
alternative would be to reconstitute the broad-based, multiparty
commissions that successfully oversaw Tunisia's free elections in October
2011 and investigated the crimes of the fallen dictatorship.
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Ennanda, which captured 41 percent of the vote in the elections, promised
to cooperate with secular parties and show respect for pluralism. Instead, it
is sending muddled messages. On Wednesday, Prime Minister Hamadi
Jebali made a conciliatory gesture by proposing a temporary nonpolitical
cabinet and new elections. Unfortunately, hard-line party members quickly
repudiated him.
Tunisia's revolution, which has overcome past crises, can overcome this
one if Ennanda and all other Tunisian parties recommit themselves to
nonviolence, mutual tolerance and upholding the rule of law.
Article 7.
The Washington Post
Iraq's return to bloodshed
Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan
February 8, 2013 -- Eighteen days of protests in Egypt in 2011 electrified
the world. But more than twice that many days of protest in Iraq have
gone almost unnoticed in the United States. Iraqi army troops killed five
Sunni protesters in Fallujah on Jan. 25, after a month of anti-government
protests in Anbar, Nineveh and Salahuddin provinces and elsewhere for
which thousands turned out. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shiite
militias are re-mobilizing. Iraq teeters on the brink of renewed insurgency
and, potentially, civil war.
This crisis matters for America. U.S. vital interests that have been
undermined over the past year include preventing Iraq from becoming a
haven for al-Qaeda and destabilizing the region by becoming a security
vacuum or a dictatorship that inflames sectarian civil war; containing
Iranian influence in the region; and ensuring the free flow of oil to the
global market.
While tensions have risen over the past two years, the triggers for recent
eruptions are clear. Prime Minister Noun al-Maliki, a Shiite, had the
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bodyguards of Finance Minister Rafie al-Issawi, who is Sunni, arrested for
alleged terrorist activities on Dec. 20 — almost exactly one year after he
ordered the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's security
detail. Hashimi fled to Turkey and is unlikely to return soon to Iraq, where
he was sentenced to death after Maliki demanded his trial in absentia for
murder and financing terrorism.
The threat to Issawi, a moderate technocrat from Anbar, galvanized Iraqi
Sunnis, who rightly saw Maliki's move as sectarian and an assault on
government participation by Sunnis not under the prime minister's thumb.
Three days after the arrests, demonstrations broke out in Ramadi, Fallujah
and Samarra. Three days after that, a large protest closed the highway
from Baghdad to Syria and Jordan. The popular resistance spread to Mosul
on Dec. 27.
These protests erupted during a constitutional crisis and as an expanding
Arab-Kurd conflict has become increasingly militarized. Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani was incapacitated by a stroke on Dec. 17 and has been out
of the countryfor treatment. Iraq's constitution specifies a line of
succession — but with one vice president in exile and the other a Shiite
and obvious Maliki proxy, Iraq has been, in effect, operating without a
president. Political processes that require presidential involvement have
been paralyzed, including moving forward with long-standing efforts by
Sunnis and Kurds to hold a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in Maliki.
Talabani had been the critical link holding Baghdad and Kurdistan
together since tensions rose following a 10-day standoff between Iraqi
army units and Kurdish pesh merga troops in October, after Maliki sent
the army toward the disputed city of Kirkuk. That move followed a series
of skirmishes and mobilizations along the "Green Line" separating
Kurdistan from Arab Iraq and a series of attacks in the area by al-Qaeda in
Iraq.
The recent protests underscore the collapse of the inclusive political
accommodation reached in 2007, which had been reconfirmed by the
formation of a grand Sunni-Shiite-Kurd coalition government after
parliamentary elections in 2010. By November 2012, Maliki had evolved
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to openly discussing his intention to form a "majoritarian government"
that would exclude the most important Sunni representatives. In mid-
December he participated in creating a Shiite grand alliance as the
launching pad for that government. The principal Sunni political leaders,
including Issawi, parliamentary speaker Osama al-Nujaifiand Anbari tribal
leader Ahmed abu Rishaannounced their intention to form their own
coalition. In short, Iraqi politics was re-fragmenting along sectarian and
ethnic lines even before the protests began.
Understood in this context, the Iraqi army's killing of protesters in
Fallujah last month is a watershed event similar to the destruction of the
Askariya shrine in Samarra in February 2006, though the crisis will not
escalate as quickly. Sunni-Shiite tensions have hitherto played out in
political forums. The key actors in today's crisis are not the Sunni political
leaders but, rather, Anbari tribal leaders, including Ali Hatem Ali
Suleiman, one of the most powerful leaders of Iraq's largest Sunni tribe.
Suleiman and fellow leaders of the Dulaim tribe were essential to
engineering the Anbar Awakening in 2007 and Sunni participation in the
government, for which they rejected al-Qaeda in Iraq and renounced
violence against the state. They responded to the killings of protesters last
month by threatening open war against the state for the first time since
2007. So far at least, they have restrained protesters and resisted violent
confrontation.
For his part, Maliki has sought to deescalate the conflict and to mollify
protesters. Tehran has also been working — to persuade Iraq's Sadrists,
whom Maliki has alienated in his consolidation of power, to abandon their
support for their Sunni brethren. Their combined efforts appear to be
working: The Sadrist Bloc, which had refused Maliki's request for
suggestions to replace Issawi and other Sunni politicians, has put forth a
substitute finance minister.
These efforts, ostensibly toward political resolution, actually increase the
likelihood of sectarian war by continuing the marginalization of Sunni
political leaders without addressing Sunni tribes' core grievances — and
by re-creating a Shiite front that had splintered.
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Al-Qaeda in Iraq has already taken advantage of this situation through its
front group, the Islamic State of Iraq, which deployed combat teams in
Fallujah last month that targeted Iraqi army positions and killed several
soldiers. The jihadists' black flags have appeared at Sunni protests and
memorial ceremonies for the fallen. The group is back in the havens it
held in 2006. If Maliki does not allow proper Sunni representation in
government, al-Qaeda will gain greater popular tolerance and foreign
support.
Over the past year, the situation in Iraq has become explosive while
sectarian sentiment and armed violence in neighboring nations have
escalated dramatically. Americans have become accustomed to watching
Iraq approach the precipice and draw back. But circumstances have
changed with the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and Maliki's year-long
efforts to intimidate his opponents through political, judicial and military
maneuvers. If Maliki does not accept many of the protesters' reasonable
demands and allow meaningful Sunni participation in government,
prospects for stopping Iraq's descent into sectarian conflict are grim.
Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War.
Frederick W. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project and a
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
',allele 8.
The American Spectator
Islam and Islamism in the Modern World
An interview with Daniel Pipes (By Tom Bethell)
February 2013 -- Daniel Pipes, one of our leading experts on Islam,
established the Middle East Forum and became its head in 1994. He was
born in 1949 and grew up in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His father,
Richard Pipes, was a professor of Russian history, now emeritus, at
Harvard. Daniel studied Arabic and Islamic history and lived in Cairo for
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three years. His PhD dissertation became his first book, Slave Soldiers
and Islam (1981). Then his interest in purely academic subjects expanded
to include modern Islam. He left the university because, as he told an
interviewer from Harvard Magazine, he has "the simple politics of a truck
driver, not the complex ones of an academic." His story of being
harassed through the legal system by a Muslim who later committed
suicide was recently told in The American Spectator ("A Palestinian in
Texas," TAS, November 2012). He has been personally threatened but
prefers not to talk about specifics except to note that law enforcement has
been involved. I interviewed Pipes shortly before Christmas, when the
Egyptians were voting on their new constitution. I started out by saying
that the number of Muslims in the U.S. has doubled since the 9/11 attacks.
DP: My career divides in two: before and after 9/11. In the first part I was
trying to show that Islam is relevant to political concerns. If you want to
understand Muslims, I argued, you need to understand the role of Islam in
their lives. Now that seems obvious. If anything, there's a tendency to
over-emphasize Islam; to assume that Muslims are dominated by the
Koran and are its automatons—which goes too far. You can't just read the
Koran to understand Muslim life. You have to look at history, at
personalities, at economics, and so on.
TB: Do you see the revival of Islam as a reality?
DP: Yes. Half a century ago Islam was waning, the application of its laws
became ever more remote, and the sense existed that Islam, like other
religions, was in decline. Since then there has been a sharp and I think
indisputable reversal. We're all talking about Islam and its laws now.
TB: At the same time you have raised an odd question: "Can Islam
survive Islamism?" Can you explain that?
DP: I draw a distinction between traditional Islam and Islamism. Islamism
emerged in its modern form in the 1920s and is driven by a belief that
Muslims can be strong and rich again if they follow the Islamic law
severely and in its entirety. This is a response to the trauma of modern
Islam. And yet this form of Islam is doing deep damage to faith, to the
point that I wonder if Islam will ever recover.
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TB: Give us the historical context.
DP: The modern era for Muslims began with Napoleon's invasion of
Egypt in 1798. Muslims experienced a great shock at seeing how
advanced the blue-eyed peoples from the north had become. It would be
roughly analogous to the Eskimos coming down south and decimating
Westerners, who would uncomprehendingly ask in response, "Who are
these people and how are they defeating us?"
TB: So how did they respond?
DP: Muslims over the past 200 years have made many efforts to figure out
what went wrong. They have experimented with several answers. One was
to emulate liberal Europe—Britain and France—until about 1920. Another
was to emulate illiberal Europe—Germany and Russia—until about 1970.
The third was to go back to what are imagined to be the sources of Islamic
strength a millennium ago, namely the application of Islamic law. That's
Islamism. It's a modern phenomenon, and it's making Muslims the center
of world unrest.
TB: But it is also creating discomfort?
DP: It has terribly deleterious effects on Muslims. Many of them are put
off by Islam. In Iran, for example, one finds a lot of alienation from Islam
as a result of the Islamist rule of the last 30-odd years.
TB: Has it happened anywhere else?
DP: One hears reports, especially from Algeria and Iraq, of Muslims
converting to Christianity. And in an unprecedented move, ex-Muslims
living in the West have organized with the goal of becoming a political
force. I believe the first such effort was the Centraal Comite voor Ex-
moslims in the Netherlands, but now it's all over the place.
TB: Nonetheless, Islam has lasted for 1,500 years.
DP: Yes, but modern Islamism has been around only since the 1920s, and
I predict it will not last as a world-threatening force for more than a few
decades. Will Muslims leave the faith or simply stop practicing it? These
are the sort of questions I expect to be current before long.
TB: What about Islam in the United States?
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DP: In the long term, the United States could greatly benefit Islam by
uniquely freeing the religion from government constraints and permitting
it to evolve in a positive, modern direction. But that's the long term. Right
now, American Muslims labor under Saudi and other influences, their
institutions are extreme, and things are heading in a destructive direction.
It's also distressing to see how non-Muslim individuals and institutions,
particularly those on the left, indulge Islamist misbehavior.
TB: How do they do that?
DP: Well, turn on the television, go to a class, follow the work of the
ACLU or the Southern Poverty Law Center, and you will see corporations,
nonprofits, and government institutions working with the Islamists,
helping promote the Islamist agenda. The American left and the Islamists
agree on what they dislike—conservatives—and, despite their profound
differences, they cooperate.
TB: Presumably some Muslims here deconvert, right?
DP: There are some conversions out of Islam, yes. And the Muslim
establishment in this country is quite concerned about that. But
numerically it is not a significant number.
TB: The ones who convert don't talk about it very much?
DP: In some cases they do; they take advantage of Western freedoms to
speak their minds. They are the exceptions, though.
TB: I suspect that the decline of Christianity has encouraged Islam.
DP: Very much so, as the contrast between Europe and the United States
reveals. The hard kernel of American Christian faith, not present in
Europe, means that Islamists are far better behaved in the United States.
They see the importance of a Christian counterforce.
TB: Earlier, you mentioned Algeria. It is a big Muslim state that we
don't hear about today.
DP: Twenty years ago Algeria was a major focus of attention. That long
ago ended, although in France coverage is still significant. Algeria is ripe
for the same kind of upheaval that we have seen in other North African
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states, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. I think it is likely to happen
before too long.
TB: What about Syria?
DP: Assad's power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see how his
regime will remain long in power.
TB: Should the United States get involved there?
DP: No, Americans have no dog in this fight and nothing in the U.S.
Constitution requires us to get involved in every foreign conflict. Two
wretched forces are killing each other; just look at the ghastly videos of
the two sides torturing and executing the other. Listen also to what they
are saying. It's a civil war involving the bad and the worse. I don't want
the U.S. government involved. That would mean bearing some moral
responsibility for what emerges, which I expect to be very unsavory.
TB: So you are supporting the Obama position?
DP: Yes, though he reaches it with far more angst. Also, there appears to
be some serious, clandestine U.S. support for the rebel forces. The
September 11 meeting in Benghazi between the Turkish and the American
ambassadors was very curious. They are both based in Tripoli, hundreds
of miles away. What were they doing in Benghazi? Arranging for
American arms going via Turkey to Syria, it appears.
TB: How important has Israel been to the revival of Islam?
DP: It is a major factor in the neighboring states. But elsewhere, in
Morocco, Iran, Malaysia, it has minor importance.
TB: Since the "Arab Spring," Israel seems increasingly beleaguered.
DP: Not really, not yet, though I agree that it will be more beleaguered
with time. Its neighbors are so consumed with their own affairs that they
hardly pay Israel attention. But once the neighbors get their houses in
order, Israel will most likely face new difficulties.
TB: You have questioned U.S. support for Islamic democracy, which
does seem naive.
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DP: The U.S. has been the patron for democracy for a century, since
Wilson's 14 Points, and a wonderful heritage it has been. When an
American travels the world, he finds himself in country after country
where his country played a monumentally positive role, especially in
democratizing the system. We naturally want to extend this to Muslim-
majority countries. Sadly, these for some time have offered an unpleasant
choice between brutal and greedy dictators or ideological, extreme, and
antagonistic elected Islamists. It's not a choice we should accept.
TB: So what should we do?
DP: I offer three simple guidelines. One, always oppose the Islamists. Like
fascists and Communists, they are the totalitarian enemy, whether they
wear long beards in Pakistan or suits in Washington.
Two, always support the liberal, modern, secular people who share our
worldview. They look to us for moral and other sustenance; we should be
true to them. They are not that strong, and cannot take power soon
anywhere, but they represent hope, offering the Muslim world's only
prospect of escape from the dreary dichotomy of dictatorship or
extremism.
Three, and more difficult, cooperate with dictators but condition it on
pushing them toward reform and opening up. We need the Mubaraks of
the world and they need us. Fine, but relentlessly keep the pressure on
them to improve their rule. Had we begun this process with Abdullah
Saleh of Yemen in 1978 or with Mubarak in 1981, things could have been
very different by 2011. But we didn't.
TB: Egypt might be the test case.
DP: Well, it's a bit late. Mohammed Morsi is not a greedy dictator but he
emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, and his efforts since reaching
power have been purely Islamist.
TB: What about the recent elections?
DP: I do not believe that a single one of the elections and referenda in
Egypt was fairly conducted. It surprises me that Western governments and
media are so gullible on this score.
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TB: You could say we were supporting the democracy element in Cairo's
Tahrir Square. Were we not?
DP: Yes and rightly so. The initial demonstrations of early 2011 were
spearheaded by the liberals and seculars who deserve U.S. support. But
they got quickly pushed aside and Washington barely paid them further
attention.
TB: We gave foreign aid to Mubarak. Was that a bad idea?
DP: That aid dates back to the utterly different circumstances of the
Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 and became progressively more wrong-
headed. It should long ago have been discontinued. More broadly, I
believe in aid for emergencies (soup and blankets) and as a bribe, but not
for economic development. That the Obama administration is
contemplating aid, including military hardware, to the Morsi government
outrages me.
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