File 025104

Images

Text

A14 Saturday, March 18, 2017
Agree or disagree with the opinions on this
page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com. If
you have an idea for an opinion article,
email it to oped@scmp.com
Loved or loathed,
globalisation
is here to stay
Andrew Sheng says the danger for
the world is that its detractors –
chief among them the US president
– will make the system less fair
by ignoring their responsibilities
Depending on who you talk to, globalisation
happened either in 1492, when Christopher
Columbus discovered America in search of the
Orient, or in the 19th century, when America
decided to look outwards for trade after its civil war.
By 2000, the movement of trade, technology,
finance and investments across the globe seemed
unstoppable. Globalisation had lifted billions from
poverty and the logic of free trade and capital flows
was accepted from Beijing to Zanzibar. But in 2007,
when the North Atlantic financial crisis revealed the
flaws of excessive financialisation, doubts about
globalisation began to creep in.
Globalisation, in the form of the spread of trade,
money, people and information, is inevitable,
essentially because of expanding demographics and
technology. Human beings migrate all over the
world, and it was technology – the invention of
railways, ships, planes and now information
communications – that accelerated the spread of
global ideas and genes.
As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, author of
Globalisation and Its Discontents, aptly put it,
globalisation is either positive or negative,
depending on how it is managed.
Like any national system, the system works well
with someone providing public goods.
The internet is such a public good. It gave even
the most remote people and places access to global
knowledge, thus making the world more inclusive.
But if and when the masses cannot benefit from
such access, technology and globalisation can
widen inequalities, giving rise to anger, frustration
and the rise of populist sentiments.
The reality is that globalisation cannot be
stopped. But it can be managed better. The issues
that arouse anti-globalists can and should be
managed. These are the interrelated issues of
climate change, disruptive technology, human
migration and toxic politics.
Being a businessman, Donald Trump’s basic
instinct is to manage these issues bilaterally, which
is why intuitively he does not like multilateral groups
like the World Trade Organisation. But these
multilateral institutions provide exactly the global
public goods that make globalisation positive rather
than damaging. What is fair to a behemoth that
accounts for 22 per cent of world gross domestic
product may not be fair to a small bilateral trading
partner one-tenth its size. The world’s multilateral
rules, which took years to negotiate, are there
because they bind everyone, large or small, to global
mutual benefit and shared stability.
What does President Xi Jinping’s ( 習近平 )
commitment to globalisation in Davos in January
really mean? There are several guiding principles
behind that gesture.
First, there is Chinese recognition that global
problems like climate change, disruptive
technology and human migration involve costs that
can only be solved from new resources generated
through growth in trade and investments.
Second, China doesn’t see globalisation as a
zero-sum game, but one where there can be benefits
for all, provided the downsides are managed on a
mutually shared basis, according to mutually agreed
multilateral rules.
Third, accounting for only 15 per cent of world
GDP, China on its own cannot push globalisation. It
must work with the current advanced economies
like Europe (25 per cent of world GDP), Japan (6 per
cent) and others.
Fourth, to be realistic, China’s contribution to
globalisation must work on the principle of
comparative advantage. Being a latecomer to
globalisation, China has considerable first-hand
experience in building infrastructure, supply chains
and urban conglomeration under third-world
conditions. Its comparative advantage is based on
the adaptation of modern technology, such as
internet platforms, to lower trading and transaction
costs. India, Kenya and other emerging markets are
also moving in the same direction.
In short, to promote the good side of
globalisation, we must apply 21st-century tools and
experience to manage 21st-century problems.
Going forward, the complexity is that Trump is
pushing the leading economy to swing from a major
contributor of global public goods to a “taxer” on
globalisation. That is the true meaning of the border
tax and the chiding of allies that they need to
contribute to any bilateral efforts in defence or in the
building of walls. But America works on the basis of
freely importing resources and talent way in excess
of domestic production. That manifests itself in its
larger and larger current account and fiscal deficits
and its growing global debt.
Which is why everyone prays that saner heads
will prevail in America’s commitment to
globalisation. “America first” cannot operate on the
basis of everyone else loses. Just as business is too
important to be left to businessmen, globalisation is
too important to be left to its discontents.
UNSHAKEABLE CORE
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says China’s ‘two sessions’ underlines the non-negotiable nature of Xi’s status as core leader
One must comprehend
the country as a whole ...
To focus only on the
economy is to distort
the lens with which
to view China
The “two sessions” in Beijing – the annual
meetings of the National People’s
Congress and the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference – offer
some sense and insight about China’s
governance. Attending them this year, I have come
away with several impressions.
One is the conjunction of two ways of thinking
that Westerners would deem incompatible: stricter
conformity and enforcement of political orthodoxy,
and greater freedom and encouragement to critique
government programmes. To understand China’s
system of governance, especially under President Xi
Jinping ( 習近平 ), now the “core” of the Chinese Communist
Party, is to appreciate why these two ways of
thinking are deemed complementary, not contradictory.
China’s leadership recognises that it needs
the wisdom of society, especially the expertise of the
intellectual elite, to critique and improve government,
but the concern is that such criticism could be
destabilising. Hence the political controls to enable
the criticism.
China watchers scrutinise everything going on
here – work reports, press conferences, policy
announcements, personnel moves, sideline comments,
even seating arrangements. Which policies
are stressed? What signals are sent? Any surprises?
What’s “in the air”?
Listening to Premier Li Keqiang ( 李克強 ) give the
annual government work report to the nearly 3,000
NPC delegates assembled in the Great Hall of the
People, one is struck by the civilisation-state
pageantry of China state power and the sheer magnitude
of managing this huge country. One must
comprehend the country as a whole, integrating
political, social, cultural and ecological sectors with
the economy. To focus only on the economy is to
distort the lens with which to view China.
To the untrained eye, the structure and phrases of
work reports look similar to those of previous years.
But look closely and one sees the small but revelatory
differences.
China’s ruling party prides itself on careful, incremental
change, and usually this is the case. But occasionally
we catch sharper breaks with past practice.
This year, three aspects stand out: reform, innovation
and, most significantly, Xi’s leadership.
First, while reform has long been a key feature of
government work reports, the pervasiveness of
reform this year makes it special. Almost every section
is founded on reform. Regarding the economy,
“supply-side structural reform” is the well-known
watchword, and the report calls for cutting industrial
overcapacity, reducing urban real estate inventory,
deleveraging Chinese firms by decreasing debt, and
cutting costs for doing business. All this I expected.
What I did not expect was the specificity of directives
for cutting costs – with five detailed prescriptions,
such as reducing a blizzard of governmentimposed
fees, about which entrepreneurs have been
complaining loudly. Reform affects almost every
aspect of society, including the household registration
system (hukou), health care, environmental
protection, intellectual property rights and streamlining
government bureaucracy.
Innovation is stressed for industrial transformation
– not simply platitudes promoting science and
technology but practical steps, such as enabling
universities and research institutes to “operate with
autonomy” and to implement “incentive policies
like stocks, options and dividends”.
It could hardly be clearer that China’s “socialism
with Chinese characteristics” continues to separate
itself from the failed forms of 19th-century socialism
that founded the old Soviet Union and was passed to
China prior to the reforms of Deng Xiaoping ( 鄧小平 ).
The pervasiveness of reform and the call for innovation
are the product of Xi’s leadership, which is what
really marked the two sessions. In his work report,
Premier Li pledged to implement “General Secretary
Xi Jinping’s major addresses and his new vision,
thinking and strategies for China’s governance”, and
the “four-pronged comprehensive strategy”, the
political theory that Xi unveiled in 2015.
One need not be a China hand to see that Xi’s
“four comprehensives” – to build a moderately
prosperous society, deepen reform, advance the lawbased
governance of China, and strengthen party
self-governance – has been elevated to a foundational
theory of the state. In the theory section of the work
report, Xi’s contributions take up 39 words in the
English translation, more than double the theories of
former leaders Deng, Jiang Zemin ( 江澤民 ) and Hu
Jintao ( 胡錦濤 ), which collectively take up 18 words.
Separately, while “Marxism-Leninism” and
“Mao Zedong thought” were duly noted in the draft
general provisions of civil law, the famous phrases
didn’t make the more important government work
report. I doubt the cut was made to save space.
The significance of Xi’s role as China’s preeminent
leader is that it provides political stability
and coherent policies, such that the crucial 19th
party congress, forthcoming in the autumn, should
play out according to expectations. My take from
speaking with delegates is that Xi’s leadership position
as core of the party is confirmed and enhanced.
This means that China can focus on the hard tasks of
enhancing reform and transforming the economy.
One other development is notable: the NPC is
becoming more an empowered deliberative body
and less a “rubber stamp” cheerleader. An example
of this is the multifaceted process of constructing a
comprehensive civil code, targeted for 2020. After
three revisions, the general provisions of civil law
finally provides a framework for codifying some 200
civil and commercial laws in constructing a legal
system to serve civil society. The NPC’s growing
confidence to disclose disputes and to allow, indeed
to encourage, debates is promising.
And what of Xi’s anti-corruption drive? Foreign
media typically assume that the drive reflects a
power struggle among leaders and factions, while
some Chinese officials claim that it has nothing to do
with political struggle.
There are multiple reasons for the campaign, of
course. More incisively, we can see how the campaign
has been energised by Xi’s “four comprehensives”
political theory. One, realising a moderately
prosperous society is hindered by corruption; two,
reform is resisted by corrupt officials who protect
their illicit financial benefits; three, the drive exemplifies
the rule of law; four, strictly governing the party
could be defined as anti-corruption.
A few of the now-caged “tigers” were convicted of
“seriously violating the party’s political discipline”
“banding together in gangs and forming factions”,
and conducting “non-organisational political activities”
– a not very veiled code-phrase for attempting to
undermine China’s leadership. By eliminating these
political threats, the anti-corruption campaign helps
ensure political stability, especially as the country
enters the final run-up to the 19th party congress.
There is now no ambiguity: China is under the
firm leadership of the party’s Central Committee,
with Xi as its core, and alignment with Xi’s “four confidences”doctrine
– in which officials are urged to be
“confident in China’s chosen path, political system,
guiding theories, and culture” – is non-negotiable.
Many areas of society and government are open
to debate, but not the core principles and not the core
leader. These have been decided and conformity is
expected. Only with such unity can the “four comprehensives”
bring about the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation and realise the Chinese dream.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, political/
economics commentator, and an international
corporate strategist. He is the host of Closer to China
with R. L. Kuhn on CGTN (produced by Adam Zhu)
John Tsang and a question of political ethics
Andrew Sheng writes on global issues
from an Asian perspective
A section of a border fence separating the US and
Mexico is under construction. Photo: Bloomberg
John Chan says Tsang’s assertion that his chief executive bid was
an afterthought is unconvincing, given events of the past two years
John Tsang Chun-wah has said he resigned as
financial secretary not to run for chief
executive, “but because of many other things”.
“Unhappiness at work was one of the reasons.
It was not a sudden decision.” He also said he
only made up his mind to run after he had left.
Most would find that hard to believe.
Judging from Tsang’s high-profile preparation
over the past two years, and the fact that he
never denied suggestions that he intended to
run, it is inconceivable that he should say he
resigned in December not to run for the top
post but for some other reason.
Consideration of political morality explains
why Tsang may have presented his case as an
unbelievable sudden decision. He knows it
would be deemed politically unethical and
immoral if he should admit to preparing to run
for two years, or even from just before Chief
Executive Leung Chun-ying unexpectedly
announced he would not seek a second term.
Former chief secretary Carrie Lam Cheng
Yuet-ngor, in stark contrast to Tsang’s wishywashy
stance, had always clearly asserted that
she would not run. Her firm denials changed
only after Leung said he would not seek a
second term. Lam was clear on the point that it
would be politically immoral for a serving
cabinet member to contest the top post with
the incumbent also running.
In the US, the last time a former cabinet
secretary became a major party’s choice for
president was in 1928, when commerce
secretary Herbert Hoover won the Republican
nomination and went on to become the 31st
US president. However, he ran only after
sitting president Calvin Coolidge said he
would not. It is political ethics that stops a US
cabinet secretary running against a president
seeking re-election. This is unlike in the
parliamentary system in the UK or
Commonwealth nations, where ministers are
elected members of the ruling party or
coalition. Ministers and other ruling party MPs
choose their party leader, who becomes the
prime minister. They also have the power to
depose and replace the incumbent.
Hong Kong’s cabinet of bureau secretaries
nominated by the chief executive is similar to
the US system. If a financial secretary wishes to
run against his chief executive who is bidding
for a second term, he must resign as soon as he
manifests such an intention – failing to do so
would be politically immoral.
Tsang was quoted as saying, when
questioned on his obvious rift with Leung
during the Wang Chau development saga,
that: “You always agree with your boss. No
question about that.” An explanatory
extension could be: “If you do not agree with
your boss, you’ve got to leave. No question
about that.” More so if he harboured an
intention to run against Leung.
Almost all local media and commentators
said Tsang had been making preparations to
run for the top post for more than two years:
Tsang himself has never denied this. It was
thus a big surprise that he should choose to say
the idea only emerged after his resignation was
approved by Beijing. It comes across as a futile
attempt to brush aside the lingering doubts
over his political morality, given his
preparations for the past two years.
John Chan is a practising solicitor and a
founding member of the Democratic Party
Printed and published by South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd, Morning Post Centre, 22 Dai Fat Street, Tai Po Industrial Estate, Tai Po, Hong Kong. Tel:2680 8888.